

Regulatory Regionalism and State Rescaling: A New Orientation in the Regional Development in Vietnam

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Abstract: By applying to Brenner's theory of state rescaling, this paper assesses Vietnam's multi-scalar regionalism strategies at two levels: macro regulatory regionalism, particularly GMS and ASEAN+ and intra-regional development institution. Then, the paper is to suggest a new government approach at a regional level as rescaling state for regional development in Vietnam and take its SWOT into account.

Key words: state rescaling; institutional reform; regional development; regulatory regionalism

JEL codes: R58

1. Background

The dynamics of regional development has been changing, thus drawing the interest of many scholars in the world. According to Coe, Hess, Yeung, Dicken, and Henderson (2004), regional development needs no internal establishment, but the opportunities are coming from external relations, competition and market. Similarly, Yeung (2009) argues that a developed state has no more sufficient conditions for regional development, but the regions need to overcome singular-scalar dynamics of endogenous regional assets to adapt to the global production network. Brenner (2004) argues that the emergence of de-territorialization in geo-economic integration does not degrade the state territory but countries will become more proactive in global economic integration both in domestic and external relationships through alternative policy strategies by providing, constructing, enforcing and controlling key conditions both upward and downward to improve their resistance in highly competitive context.

In terms of application, there is a gap in the research of the regional development institution for Vietnam in an ever more complicated globalization context. Painter (2005) argues that the ability of Vietnamese government is a key test of outcomes of institutional reform. Most agreed with Painter (2005) that Doi Moi is a process of partial liberalization in Vietnam, in which the restructure is aimed at the concrete opportunities to achieve the power and wealth in a definite and special context. However, it is no longer the good motivation for Vietnam to continue its renovation and development. At present, the Vietnamese State has been deploying its economic reforms in a cautious way. In this paper, the author is to exploit the multi-scalar regionalism in Vietnam and suggest a new orientation for the regional development in Vietnam.

This paper has two objectives. Firstly, the author would like to examine that how is multi-level regionalism at

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present in Vietnam? The article offers a new perspective on state rescaling for the regional development in Vietnam in the context of globalization and regionalization, and contributed to the transformation and adaptation of state institutions in the context of regional integration. Secondly, the author would like to discuss should whether rescaling state in the current regionalism situation at present in Vietnam or not? The essay tries to exploit the SWOT analysis of the new direction in the multi-level regulatory regionalism context is to ensure accountability of localities and to harmonize the institutional model of the regulatory regionalism and national institutions.

2. Literature Reviews

Along these trends of globalization and regionalization, the context of regional development has been dramatically reformed in changes of patterns, thus creating more and more challenges (Pike, 2006). Therefore, public administrative leading agencies need to reconsider and to assess their strategies for the proactive response to the global opportunities. The role of regional development policies is more important than in improving the competitiveness of the regions and promoting the endogenous resources of the localities (OECD, 2010). In terms of domestic study on state and its related issues, in the past 20 years, there are numerous evaluation studies of the state's strategies and projects in the different themes, periods and policies. For instance, some scholars would focus on changing the public system, for example, the characteristics of the reform of the system (Diệp, 2008), the state's reform in the direction of the rule of law (T. T. Nguyen, 2005) or V. I. Lenin's perspective on the state's restructure (Trinh, 2010) and the system reform of local authorities (H. D. Nguyen, 2006) etc. Besides, there are other studies on many distinct branches of administrative and institutional changes such as organizational reform (Dang & Doan, 2010) institutional reform (Le, 2013), developmental state (Beeson & Pham, 2012), economic reforms (Pham, 2015) etc. On the other hand, some scholars would also be interested in the reform of regional development policy such as cross-border cooperation (Gainsborough, 2007), local development policy in Vietnam (Hoang, 2011b, 2012a), geographical organization and regional economic development planning in Vietnam (Hoang, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2012b; Ngo, 2009).

However, in about 30 analyzed Vietnamese research papers, there is a deficiency on regulatory regionalism and the state's response in the globalizing context. Moreover, almost all of these articles present the situation, data and solutions of the state's strategies and programs in a particular period, typically about ten years in content. Theoretically, there is shortage of multi-dimensional awareness of the state's restructure in the globalization context.

From the international studies on Vietnam, there are more and more studies on international relationships and strategic cooperation in bilateral and even multilateral manner such as: to what extent Vietnam has benefit from FDI since entry into ASEAN 1995 (Mirza & Giroud, 2004), Laos' position within changing investment and trade relationship with China, Vietnam and Thailand (Goto, 2011), Mekong region and institution weakness (J. P. A. Verbiest, 2013), regional cooperation in South China Sea (Kao, Pearre, & Firestone, 2012), cross-border trade between Thailand and its neighbours (Krainer & Routray, 2015), the normalization of foreign relationship between China and Vietnam (Hiep, 2013), even transnational cooperation and Vietnamese state in globalization (Gainsborough, 2007). However, there is shortage on full multi-level regionalism and territory re-articulation for Vietnam in the context of Pacific-Asia region. Therefore, regulatory regionalism of Jayasuriya (2015) creates new debate and challenges for Asia-Pacific countries in the approach of building regional capacity. On the other

hand, there is the deficit of studies in the applied study of regionalism models on the state space with the point of view of development institutionalism.

To sum up, in about 50 analyzed research papers, the author recognizes there are some deficiencies in the following literature. In practice, there are no empirical studies on state reform in space approach in Vietnam. In fact, there are not any applied researches on the impact of regionalism and regionalization on the public sector and developmental issues in the Vietnamese literature, and even there is also an insufficiency in the international study. Therefore, at first, there are problematic challenges for scholars to approach spatial planning because regions are based on characteristics of territories, people, and culture. Last but not least, the demand of studying on administrative-economic-social authorities by areas has been increased in the regionalization context.

2.1 Re-conceptualizing Regionalism and State Rescaling

Previously, new regionalism is a single conception involved the emergence of new forms of governance in state-society paradigms that suggested new forms of relevant political actions separating from the state and from the seemingly inflexible territory of the state. It can also be understood as a scientific basis of the concepts of integration of economic dynamism, administrative efficiency, community empowerment, civil society, responsive governance within a spatial framework of the regions (James W. Scott, 2009).

In recent years, the transformation of statehood has attracted attention of many scholars in many sectors: politics, economics, public administration (Brenner, 2004). In the globalization context, many scholars predicted a forthcoming death of national state power because of borderless and global economic integration (Hardt & Negri, 2001; Ohmae, 1996; Strange, 1996). However, the new forms of statehood have been established in respond to international and domestic pressure (Brenner, 2004). These contemporary studies concentrated on two scales: national and supranational (Brenner, 2004).

According to Brenner (2004), new formations of political economic space are re-established by three contemporary global mainstreams including global economic integration, regional and urban resurgence as well as the consolidation of supranational and cross-border institution. These trends have been re-articulated by trans-local linkages and cross-border cooperation initiatives among local governments (Hocking, 1999; Markus Perkmann, 2002).

The proliferation of the literature on state spatial restructure and state rescaling kicked off and has been examined more and more in practice along with the contemporary globalization mainstreams. The literature has been investigated in many practical fields and in many regions around the world such as: new regionalism in Germany (Gualini, 2004) new regionalism in California (Jonas & Pincetl, 2006), rescaling state in Europe (Gualini, 2006) uneven development in South Korea (Park, 2008), reconfiguration of state space in Belgium (Oosterlynck, 2010), rescaling Chinese state and multi-scalar in Yunan (Xiao Su, 2012a, 2014), politics of spatial policy in Hungary (Varró & Faragó, 2016). More concretely, scholars attempt to define “rescaling as a complex set of political-institutional and social practice that put spatial scale at issue in public policy and governance” (Gualini, 2006) or as refer transformation of economic, social and political systems creates new spatial levels above, below and across the national state (Swyngedouw, 2004) the process of change of social regulation, collective action and representation from national state to new territorial levels (Keating, 2013a). In a different perspective, it is as a process in which the influences derived from the established structure of the state to new state spatial interactions via emerging political projects and strategies (Park, 2008) that lays stress on the central position of the state representative to respond the transformation of territorial regulation in the development process (Gualini, 2006) and to improve the administrative efficiency of state institution in economic restructure

(Brenner, 2009; Jessop, 2002; Peck, 2002; Xiaobo Su, 2012a).

2.2 Qualitative Approach in Multi-Regionalization

Brenner (2009) believes that “state rescaling could benefit substantially from greater methodological reflexivity at every level of the dialectical spiral, from the abstract to the concrete and vice versa.” He creates three research methodologies for state rescaling including: explanation, comparison and periodization. Firstly, “logics of explanation” can be understood “in structure terms as the expression or outcome of large-scale political-economic tendencies”, “in strategic terms as political response to the dislocation, challenges and contradictions arisen through those macrostructural tendencies” and “in explanation terms as a trend or condition engendering specific political-economic consequences.” Secondly, Brenner (2009) believe that “comparison” research of “rescaling processes is particularly challenging” because it will require the elaboration of process-oriented research strategies in which the trajectories rather than units are analytically juxtaposed.” Thirdly, Brenner (2009) defined state rescaling in two periodization approaches: “policy trajectories and institutional reorganization” A significant strand of the literature on state rescaling is focused on such policy trajectories in reviewing the studies above. Next, in the second approach, “state rescaling involves examining the evolving scale articulation of a particular institutional-territorial space — be it a supra regulatory agency, a national state, a region, a city or a cross-border zone”. Here, the notion of rescaling refers to a process of institutional reorganization. To the degree that the scalar configuration of institution or territory under investigation is qualitatively modified — whether through the recalibration of existing organization scales or the construction of entirely new ones — the challenge of periodization arises. Most “authors trace the rescaling of state spaces within the region under study concerning the contested evolution of formal governmental institutions as well as new strategies of political-economic intervention. Luckily, “these two approaches to the periodization of state rescaling are certainly not mutually exclusive.” Indeed, if they are combined within a well-focused, theoretically grounded research agenda, they can strongly complement each another so as to generate both concrete and meso-level insight into the trajectories of the history of the state rescaling in different global regions and national state spaces.

The authors tries to apply the two above-said periodization approaches from Brenner (2009) to make them suitable to the regional development policies in Vietnam.

3. Multi-scalar Regionalism for Vietnam

According to a recent approach of Jayasuriya (2009), a conception of “regulatory regionalism” gradually established transformation of the national space in individual countries in Asia-Pacific. This mechanism does not only orientate the economic and trade integration, but it also governs and coordinates regulations of a wider extra-region. Besides, the initiatives of the countries in the network are judged carefully with their strengths and weaknesses as the emerging parts and consolidation of regional institution. Regulatory regionalism is emerging as the process of transformation of state space that goes beyond the traditional territory of the state for cross-border cooperation (Jayasuriya, 2009). However, he also argues that the regulatory regionalism needs requirements relating to harmonization of standards and the standardized rules such as: transparency, cooperation capacity and microeconomic policies. Besides, this type of governance is still rudimentary as a new form of governance in Asia-Pacific (Jayasuriya, 2009).

This papers attempts to shift the traditionally aspatial perspectives on state restructure to the view on the horizontal approach instead of vertical ones in state reform in the globalization context in Vietnam, making a

contribution to the institution-adapting strategy of other nations.

3.1 Regionalism — The Extended Development Spaces (Table 1)

Table 1 The Trajectory of Regulatory Regionalism in the Extended Development Spaces in Vietnam

	Members	Stage	Objectives	General Policy Framework
GMS	1992- now China, Thailand, CLMV	1992-2002	Connectivity Competitiveness Community	ADB(2009) - Strategic framework and action plan for human resources development in the greater Mekong subregion (2009-2012)
		2002-2012	To strengthen infrastructure linkage	ADB -(2009)- The Economics of Climate Change in Southeast Asia: A Regional Review
		2012-	To facilitate cross-border trade, investment and tourism To enhance private sector participation and competitiveness To develop human resources To protect the environment and to promoting the sustainable use of shared natural resources	ADB- (2010) - Transport and Trade Facilitation in the GMS: Confronting Rising Inequality in Asia ADB (2011) - Greater Mekong Subregion Cross-Border Transport Facilitation Agreement Instruments and Drafting Histor – ADB-(2011)- The Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Program Strategic Framework ADB-(2011) - Greater Mekong Subregion: Tourism Sector Assessment,Strategy, and Road Map ADB-(2012) - Greater Mekong Subregion Power Trade and Interconnection ADB-(2012)- Trade and trade facilitation in the Greater Mekong region
MRC	MC: (C)LV, Thailand	1957-now	To manage Mekong water resource	MRC – (2011) - Integrated water resources management-based: Basin development strategy MRC -(2011)- Strategic Plan 2011–2015
Japan-Mekong Cooperation	Japan, Thailand, CLMV	1994-1997	To provide training and capacity building	MOFA (2004) -Joint press release of Cambodia, Laos Vietnam (CLV) and Japan Summit MOFA (2008) - Mekong-Japan action plan 63 MOFA (2012) - Mekong-Japan action plan for realization of the “Tokyo Strategy 2012”
		1997-2004	To support ASEAN integration	
		2004-2012	Economic Cooperation and Development	
		2012-now	To enhance Mekong connectivity Developing together Ensuring human security and environment sustainability	
South Korea -Mekong Cooperation		2008-now	- To develop Mekong region - To accelerate ASEAN integration	MOFAT (2011) - Han-River declaration of establishing the Mekong-ROK comprehensive partnership for mutual prosperity
Multinational LMI	US, Thailand, CLV	2009-2012	to foster sub-regional cooperation and capacity building in areas of education, health, environment, and connectivity	Department of State of the United States of America (2012) Lower Mekong initiative.
	US, Thailand, CLMV	2012-now		
ASEAN–Australia Development Cooperation Program	Australia, CLV	1994-2000	- Connectivity - Trade	Australia AID (2012) Australian Mekong water resources program annual program performance report 2011
	Australia, ASEAN	2000-now		
IAI AFTA	ASEAN	1967-now	To narrow development gap within ASEAN Free trade	ASEAN (2009) Initiative for ASEAN integration (IAI) strategic framework and IAI work plan 2 (2009-2015)
RCEP	ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand	2012-now	Free trade	Under negotiation
TPP	Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Peru, Singapore, United State, Vietnam	2008-now	Free trade Regulatory regionalism	Under negotiation

3.1.1 China-Greater Mekong Subregion–Vietnam

Historically, the conception of Indochina peninsular was known in nineteenth century under the French rule. The successful anti-colonial battles on the Indochina peninsular have brought a vision of close cooperation among Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (CLV) since 1975 and many foundation commitments have been signed by three countries since then (John, 2006). However, it seems that the concept of Indochina is gradually becoming obsolete

because each nation is seeking different competitive advantages in the new market economic context. The seed of regional regulatory frame was initiated as the “Committee for Coordination on the Lower Mekong Basin” in 1957 and later as “Mekong Committee” (MC). After a long and unstable history, it became the Mekong River Commission (MRC) (J. P. A. Verbiest, 2013).

The succeed of international lending organization to address the development gap within the region, particularly the Asian Development Bank (ADB) brought a new configuration within the region in 1990s. With the support of ADB, the participation of China Yunan’s government created a new structure for the region that was called as Great Mekong Subregion (GMS) in 1992 (Xiao Su, 2014; J. P. A. Verbiest, 2013). GMS programs provides a coordination frame for member states in cross-border and economic development (Xiaobo Su, 2012b; 2014).

At the beginning of the GMS program, the strategy framework was agreed to focus on infrastructure connectivity and the letter “C” later would become the three “Cs” — connectivity, competition and community (J. P. A. Verbiest, 2013). On the basis of the GMS Summit in Phnom Penh in 2002, the comprehensive strategic framework for sub region’s development was established. It included five strategic thrusts to develop infrastructure connectivity and human resources to promote cross-border trade, investments, private sector participation and to protect natural environment (ADB, 2011b). Along the strategic framework of the GMS cooperation, a range of programs for GMS cooperation on cross-border transportation, tourism, power trade, private sector inclusion are issues in details (ADB, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012a, 2012b).

The influence of financial governance systems, particularly ADB provides new patterns of policy experimentation and reform at multilevel governance (Jayasuriya, 2015). Dent (2008) proposed that main development of new regulatory regionalism in East Asia is based on financial and trade awareness, and regional operation and integration activities are particularly orientated by the process of development of less developed countries. Similarly, Jayasuriya (2015) proposed that the significant role of ADB, the connectivity of formal intergovernmental mechanism and post-Fordist supply side industrialization has shaped the development of Asian capitalism.

Since the beginning of millennium, the Mekong regulatory regionalism has changed by a range of new cooperation agreements with Japan, Korea, Singapore, Australia and US. Firstly, there are some other programs initiated by Japan’s Forum of Comprehensive Development in Indochina 1993 and ASEAN-MITI Economic and Industrial Cooperation Committee in 1998 to support training and to build capacity for Mekong region. These programs has continued to be concretized by Mekong-Japan action plan 63 and “Tokyo strategy 2012” (Sudo, 2004; J. P. A. Verbiest, 2013). Korea has also emerged as an important partner to develop and to accelerate Mekong region integration into ASEAN when it committed to double overseas development assistance (ODA) to ASEAN between 2008-2015, especially, it also is the largest investor in Vietnam. Besides, in 2009, USAID also supported the Mekong region to mitigate environmental issues in infrastructural development. Moreover, Australia has also supported the development of the regions such as the project of building major bridges over the Mekong River, the HIV prevention project and the project of reducing the living standard disparity like the IAI (J. P. A. Verbiest, 2013).

3.1.2 ASEAN Regulatory Regionalism

The ASEAN was founded in 1967 with the main focus on regional security. However, the creation of ASEAN has never been a big plan for regulatory regionalism in the Southeast Asian region. Previously, the members did not feel the need to create a strong regional institution. The establishment of ASEAN Free Trade

Area in 1992 did not help to create a strong framework for the region from external economic shock but it only promoted the core member's economies such as: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Philippines (Masron & Yusop, 2008). Only after the Asian economic crisis, the institutional frame showed a lot of weaknesses and characteristics which are inconsistent with the region's development trends.

Recently, in the context of globalization and the strong regionalism, the institutional frame of ASEAN has showed many weaknesses and inconsistent characteristics with new development trends of the region. In fact, the decision-making system based on the consensus of ASEAN makes the process slow and the process of operation cumbersome and delayed. The financial contributions from the member states are also limited and the application of the structural budgetary ceiling is low because of limited financial resources of the member states such as CLMV (ADBI, 2014).

However, the regional cooperation framework of ASEAN regionalism tends to shift towards a stronger economic community by 2030, with 4 platform goals. This principle frame is heading for the stronger potential institutional frame with the help of the ADB. This institution is formed from three different previous programs of ADB including: Brunei Darussalam–Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP), Greater Mekong Sub region (GMS), and Indonesia–Malaysia–Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) (ADB, 2016). This is a necessary step towards the Asian- Pacific region balanced by the ADB with the emergence of China and the establishment of new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. This is a shift towards a better suitable trend of globalization to ensure the sustainable benefit among the member states and the regional competitive capacity.

However, the new institutional frame has also a potential risk if the institutional frame of ASEAN does not guarantee to narrow the development gap between the ASEAN-6 and the CLMV members in the process of forming the new rules of ASEAN. The new institutional issues should be reviewed to ensure compensation mechanism for countries adversely affected by integration, therefore, there will be more of these considerations of member states in the process of institutional reform of ASEAN (ADBI, 2014).

Regulatory regionalism has been more interesting with the emergence of China after it became the second largest economy in the world. The Chinese proposal of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership with ASEAN + 3 groups of countries show not only its expectation on integrated economic regionalization but also its desire for an international economic liberalism. But US proposal for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is as contrast example for regulatory regionalism competition (Jayasuriya, 2015). One of the distinctive dimensions of TPP is not only to deeply focus on economic integration but also to stipulate regulatory regime such as: environmental policy, labour conditions, food safety, even social policy (Jayasuriya, 2015).

Recently, the frame of the Asian Pacific regulatory regionalism has changed more powerfully when President Xi Jin Ping of China proposes the One Belt One Road Strategy. This is the regional development strategy of China to boost the market dynamism from the east to the west and to promote international economic liberalism. A new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has been set up with the objective of promoting its influence on the Asian Pacific region and as a strategy against the rebalance policy of US in Asia. It has asserted to add the financial capital for ADB and World Bank to promote cross-border connection and economic integration in Southeast Asia. Besides, another function is to implement the “One Belt One Road” initiative with \$40 billion (more than two third of its charter capital) (Ren, 2016). The new financial frame as a promising potential enables China to build a new regulatory regionalism in Asia-Pacific.

3.2 Internal Development Institution (Table 2)

This chapter is about how to make clearer regional development institutions inside the Vietnamese territory

and how these institutions work and why regional development is not really effective in Vietnam. It is also a policy foundation for regional development. It is also a good reference for the regulation quality reform, one of the weakest in six factors of indicators of World Governance Index (World Bank, 2016). In other words, regulatory regionalism refers to a national process of decentralization and the process of region-building with the purpose of improving the effectiveness and responsibility of governance (James Wesley Scott, 2009).

Table 2 The Scalar and Territorial Dimensions of the Regional Development Institutions in Vietnam

Goals	Objectives	Objective Regions	Main responsibility	Coordination units	Policy framework
Regional Articulation	Extra-regional articulation	GMS ASIAN MR	The central government, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs,	Minister of Industry and Trade (MIT) Ministry of Transport (MT) PAs (Department of Foreign Affairs)	Instruction 41/2010 (CVP)
	Intra-regional articulation	MRN CHs SWR	Vice Prime Ministers (members of Political Bureau)	Ministry of Police (MP) Ministry of Defense (MD) PAs	Decision 96/2012 (Political Bureau)
Planning	Regional Planning	PERN, PERM, PERS RRD, MRD MRN CHs SWR	CG(PM, VPMs) Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI)	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) Ministry of Transport (MT) ... PAs	The law on Land (2013) Decision 198/2014 the general five-year PERN planning (CG) Decision 1114/2013 the general five-year PERM planning (CG) Decision 252/2014 the general five-year PERS planning (CG) Decision 795/2013 the general economic-social five-year RRD planning (CG) Decision 245/2014 the general five-year MRD planning (CG)
	Provincial Planning	Every Provinces	Provincial Authority (The Head of Provincial People's Committee)	DAs	63 general five-year provincial plans (PAs)
Allocation	Frequency Local Expenditure	Every provinces	CG,MF	PAs	The Investment Law 2014 (NA) The Public Investment Law 2014 (NA) The State's Budget Law 2015 (NA)
	Investment Projects (IPs)	Every provinces	NA (Large IPs), CG (Medium IPs), PAs (Small (IPs)	CG (MPI and MF), PA	
Redistribution	Provincial Disparity	The poor areas The rural areas	CG Ministry of Finance (MF)	MARD, PAs	Decision 1489/2012 the national goal program on sustainable poverty alleviation (CG) Decision 800/2010 the national goal program on building new countryside (CG)
Policy-building	Labor Training	The whole country	Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs	PAs	The Labour Code 2012 (NA) The Law on Social Insurance 2014 (NA) Decision 1201/2012 the national goal program on employment (CG) Decision 122/2015 the minimum salary by regions (CG)
	Healthcare, Education System	The whole country	Ministry of Health Ministry of Education	PAs	The Health Insurance Law 2008 (NA) The Education Law 2005 (NA)
	Land environment and issues	The whole country	MONRE	PAs	The Environment Protect Law 2014 (NA) Decision 158/2008 the national goal programs on climate change

According to the modification from alternative frame (Keating, 2013a), the regional development institution in Vietnam is divided into five dimensions including: regional articulation, territorial planning, redistribution of regional differences, allocation of regional resources and policy-building. It is showed in Table 2 that related to multi-scalar dimensions to highlight the regional development institutions in Vietnam

It is known that regional re-articulation is paid attention to in an expanded space, the main responsibility of extra-regional dimension or cross-border cooperation depends on the Vietnamese Central Government (CG)

instead of provincial governments. At this level, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was assigned to take charge of helping the Prime Minister in the free trade commitments and in the bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Although Vietnam has been the member of these free trade agreements for many years, the economic function of the diplomatic activities is yet to have been the highlights. The economic diplomatic issues have become an important task after Vietnam joined WTO in 2007 (Vietnam, 2010). Many provincial authorities have established their own department of foreign affairs in provinces in order to settle the problems relating to the cross-border cooperation, the border gate issues; even many provinces have set up the provincial industrial and economic zones (Government, 2014).

As for the intra-regional coupling or provincial linkages at regional level, it inherited functions from the war period such as regional political security in three main regions: Central Highlands (CHs), mountainous region of the North (MRN) and South West Region (SWR) where there are always many politically hot issues. Each region has been taken charge of by a Deputy Prime Minister with the consultation of the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). In recent years, these regions have been mobilized to link together in economic development (Vietnam, 2012).

In terms of regional development planning, the main regional development planning is issued every five years for 5 regions including the Pivotal Economic Region of the North (PERN), the Pivotal Economic Region of the Middle (PERM), the Pivotal Economic Region of the South (PERS), the Red-River Delta (RRD) and the Mekong-River Delta (MRD). These regional plans are the most important documents in regional development plans that confirm the regional potentials, and assess the development situation of the regions and spatial orientation for regional development. After that, provincial People's Committees enact the provincial plans based on the regional strategic frame. It creates the overlapping in planning function, causing many violations and corruptions in land management. Moreover, I also agree with (Painter)'s viewpoint that Vietnam is governed through a fragmented and incoherent institution that weakens the Party-State's control. According to some economists, the rationale behind this is that the local government is empowered with great autonomy in development planning and it has the right to decide the construction of infrastructure in its region (M. P. Nguyen, 2013). At this point, the author would like to lay stress on land policy as the development planning function because it has closely associated the territorial spatial projects of the State with the national development issues. There is overlapping responsibility on development issues at the Central Governmental level when the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) enacts the regional development planning, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) issues land planning simultaneously. According to the Law on Land of 2013, the land plans are decentralized and superimposed upon the hierarchy of the public administration system every five years based on the ten-year development orientation of the People's Committees. This has further exacerbated the weakness of the government's control on development issues. In other words, it has created the extremely complicated regional development matrix. Moreover, McPherson (2012) argues that the short-term vision of land policy makes the public investments inefficient. It also put the negative externalities on the environment and the actors lose their motivation in agricultural production. The main losers are the Vietnamese government, farmers and rural residents.

At first glance, the main responsibility belongs to the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) and these functions are reasonable for the function of MPI, but if it is considered with other functions of the policy frame, there is asynchrony among the dimensions of regional development. In other words, after the building of

development policy frame at regional and provincial levels, the authority makes a decision — whether investment projects (IPs) are implemented or not; it is decentralized by the size of IPs followed by the Law on Investment and the Law on Public Investment. For example, according to the Law on Public Investment, large IPs using investment capital of VND 10,000 billion or more is decided by the National Assembly (NA), the medium IPs from VND 2,300 billion to VND 10,000 billion are decided by the Prime Minister and the small IPs from VND 120 billion to VND 2,300 billion are decided by Ministers and the smallest under VND 120 billion are decided by the local authority. Most of NA's decisions for the large IPs are based on regional policy frame of the Central Government and of the Provincial People's Committees, therefore it makes a vicious circle in investments (Figure 1).




Figure 1 The Existing System of Regional Development Institution in Vietnam (Modification from Xiao Su, 2014)

Due to the decentralization processes from the central government in investment and the continuous efforts of local government in attracting foreign development investment and official development assistance capitals (ODA), the result is that it has created a race among the localities that have built 260 industrial parks and almost all of all provinces have their own industrial parks (World Bank, 2016). This process began from the shortage of the support funds of the Central Government to cover mandated local expenditure and locality have to seek out other sources of revenue from sponsored economic activities (Painter, 2005). It has launched a new large investment wave of FDI and ODA into localities.

At first glance, it reflects the attractiveness and potentials of the economy in attracting the foreign investment capital. However, when all of the provincial governments operate independently in attracting foreign investments, it is also becoming an obstacle to regional development called Vietnam having 63 “economies”, it evenly makes negative impact on sustainability and stability of the regions. It has also created the negative competition among regions and eroded the cooperation among localities and the linkage of cooperation between neighboring regions.

Because of highly decentralized, fragmented and sometimes incoherent set of the State institution (Painter,

2005), state spatial projects in Vietnam are piled on the existing state institutions to create a matrix of regional development. It creates the effectiveness in national goal programs of rural development, hunger eradication and poverty reduction because it has attracted many social components, state and non-state organizations. The evidence is that Vietnam has made a lot of efforts to become a middle-income country by 2020 and implemented many break-through policies in the work of eradication of hunger and alleviation of poverty highly appreciated by international communities. Most of these state spatial projects are the mechanism of redistribution of resources to harmonize society and reduce the rural-urban and rich-poor disparity. Thanks to fragmented state institution, these state projects succeed much more than expected. But when the new large investment has gone, the deficit of local budget and the increasing short-term expenditure at local and central levels are coming back, resulting in degrading the effectiveness of these national target programs in localities.

As for policy-building, all of other issues relating to education, healthcare and environment are controlled directly by the host ministries. Almost all of policies are implemented in vertical governmental mechanism. The host ministries, who are main responsible units, coordinate with other ministries and the provincial People's Committees in order to directly deploy the sector's decisions in the whole territories of the country. In reality, the host ministries have only one mechanism to coordinate with the professional department of the provincial People's Committees to implement the state projects. Therefore, the plans of the host ministries can not be able to meet the demand of inspection, of investigation and of policy support in localities because each ministry has to control the 63 professional departments at localities. This issue has degraded the effectiveness of management and the coordination between the Central Government and the provincial administrations.

This makes soft-infrastructure supports ((business support mechanisms, transparent and public information mechanisms, training and labor policies) of government very weak. Recently, the state has called for institutional reform and has made much effort such as: local labour training policy, business support services, e-government to support the community of enterprises in the whole country. However, basically, almost all of these efforts are not as effective as expected. The first reason is the too many local units were directly managed by the ministries as stated above. The second reason is because of fragmented resources and the limitation of local budget. These development projects of local governments have become ineffective gradually. Nevertheless, there are some signals to control and to support the provincial People's Committees and to get better results at regional levels as some recent policies such as the minimum salary by regions, entrance examinations at universities by regions... These signals have brought about the initial significant achievements but it is needed further researches and developments.

To sum up, there are numerous provincial level governments — 63 units (58 provinces and 5 municipalities) and the state fragmentation creates the inertia and inefficiencies in formulating and implementing policy. Moreover, it has also created the hurdles to the central budget when provincial authorities are granted to raise the local budget from the ODA source to develop investment projects. "Vietnam is now one of the most debt fiscally decentralized countries in East Asia and the provincial government's expenditures account for more than half the total public budget and more than 70 percent of public investments" (World Bank, 2016). Moreover, many state projects from many sectors making use of the decentralized and fragmented local institutions have created a matrix of regional development.

4. State Rescaling for the Regional Development in Vietnam

According to Keating (2013b), 30, “State rescaling is partly driven by functional change, notably in the economy, with economic change responding to new spatial logics at all levels, a phenomenon known as the ‘new regionalism’”. Jayasuriya (2009) assumes that globalization is determined as an internal process which transforms state space more than external processes that increased flow of trade and capital.

As the most striking features of economic development of many East Asian countries, “the well-worn path of state-led developmentalism is being followed by Vietnam” (Beeson & Pham, 2012). It is believed that the state plays the important role in accelerating and shaping the process of development in East Asian countries and Vietnam is not an exception (Beeson, 2007; Beeson & Pham, 2012). Along with many processes of international integrations and economic cooperations, Vietnam has made a lot of efforts to adapt to new situation in the creative and surprising ways.

4.1 Territorial Articulation of State Spatial Strategies

“The key issue is not how the state should territorialize its own administrative and regulatory functions but rather how it should reconfigure the geographies of capital accumulation and socioeconomic activity within its territorial borders” (Brenner, 2004, p. 100).

The new approach of Jayasuriya (2015) shows when the global economic rules is diversified, regional integration in Asia gives more opportunities to national-states in regional regulatory framework. He proposes that new global arrangements in global governance, particularly the rising power of China, force countries to re-conceptualize the relationship between the State management and regional regulatory frame. The author proposes that this approach become an analytical tool for the State-country to explain its strategy and implement new steps in a more complicated context of regionalization and globalization.

Moreover, cross-, inter- and intra-regional relationships need to be re-organized in a new regional development strategy. Although ADB and its stance on more proactive policy cooperation and coordination rather than passive integration plays the significant role in shaping strategic regionalism (Dent, 2008), new spaces in the transformation of the state need to implement parallelly and synchronically (Figure 2).

Jayasuriya (2015) discovers that there is a new model of regulatory regional governance — regulatory regionalism. The new approach in regional governance in Asia Pacific focuses more on the internal transformation of the state rather than on establishment of new regional institutions. In the regionalization context, the new regional regulatory regime (Jayasuriya, 2009) changes inside the existing patterns of private-public partnership or “in a nutshell of state transformation” (Jayasuriya, 2015). This regulatory transformation would be further deepened by modifying the incentive, capital and capacities of players with the multi-national mechanism through the transformation of the state.

“Regions have emerged as functional spaces, as political space, as a level of interest articulation, as institutions of administration and regulations, and as governments, charged with substantial responsibilities in public policy and spending” (Keating, 2013a, p. 137). Functional or institutional rescaling re-establishes the public policy agenda, as different issues are notable at each level. While each regional government has their own competences, they need different regulatory frameworks. Keating (2013a) proposes that there are five great impacts of regional policy frame including: development, redistribution, allocation, ecosystem and policy building.

According to Stoker (1998), the role of government is system management by providing leadership, forming

cooperation and regulating the overall environment by defining situations, identifying stakeholders and managing relationships between parties. A new form of governance has changed relations between levels of government involving new forms of cooperation and coordination. It has also developed new institutions responsible for design, implementation and management of development strategy. Potentially, the new form of governance can also foster the mobilization of civil society and promote the formation of network and partnership that can provide a basis for economic and social progress (Pike, 2006).

In this paper we focus on the institutions of administration and regulation of development issues (Table 3).




Figure 2 The Expected System of Regional Development Institution in Vietnam (Modification from Xiao Su, 2014)

Table 3 SWOT Analysis of Rescaling State in Vietnam

	Extra-regulatory regionalism	Intra-regional institution
Positive dimensions	<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Re-articulation in multi-scalar regionalization - Economic growth (James W. Scott, 2009) 	<p>Strengths</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The local authorities are more proactive in international economic integration issues and regional innovative policies - The CG may reduce the number of directly managed units at local level.
Negative dimensions	<p>Threats</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Depend on political factors, increasing the political risks and local autonomy (James W. Scott, 2009) - Eroding the unity of territorial border 	<p>Weakness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - State budget system

4.1.1 Opportunities

The centre of rescaling state in this paper is a new alternative regional government level. The main goal of this rescaling is territorial re-articulation in the Fordism and regulatory regionalism context in Asia-Pacific.

Firstly, it creates the opportunities for the National Assembly (NA) to adapt the domestic development institution into regulatory regionalism from ADB, AIIB and other financial institutions.

According to World Bank (2016), institutional capacity and reform is said to be the weakest problem in Vietnam and it is in the centre of reform processes in the next 20 years. According to global governance index, Vietnam is one of the three weakest nations in the Southeast Asian region on global governance indicators. The reason for slow reforms of Vietnam in the institutional capacity is that Vietnam owns the system of socialist state. The socialist-oriented market economy of Vietnam was initially effective certainly after the 90s of the last century; however, due to the lack of long term vision and the contradictions in the economic development between the capitalism and socialism, Vietnam is still facing major challenges in the next steps. Recently, Vietnam is under pressure from the regulatory regionalism from ASEAN (ADB now), from GMS (ADB previously), the strong influence of globalization rules from ASEAN + 3, ASEAN + 6 ..., TPP, CPTPP. The main task of negotiations is maintained by the Central Government; however, in order to better adapt to the new institutions in the region and internationalization, the National Assembly (NA) needs the change of the internal institution to catch up with the mechanism of globalization and regionalization regime in a more proactive way.

Secondly, due to the geographical characteristics with its long coastline, Vietnam needs to promote the advantages of geographic location in the region that includes the new regional government that may coordinate well with the Central Government in the most proactive way and coordinate effectively with neighboring areas such as PERN government that may promote the maritime network development with the countries of Australia, Northeast Asia such as Japan and Korea; such PERS government and PERN government that may coordinate with the Central Government to proactively adapt GMS in a more efficient way to become a strategic region in commerce in Asia-Pacific region. In other words, the PERN government may focus on coordinating Yunan region from China, the Northeast region and the far-east region from Lao as a development group and the PERS government may concentrate on coordinating two Eastern regions of Cambodia to promote infrastructure development and regional connectivity in GMS and MR.

According to James Wesley Scott (2009), it has been argued that region-building is essential to establish spaces that are large and cohesive enough to support material production in terms of markets, technology and spontaneous growth.

4.1.2 Strengths

The regional authorities are more proactive in the international economic integration issues thanks to working directly with other regional governments of their countries. This reduces a large amount of documents issued from central government to local governments involved in the related issues, even minimizing inefficiencies in the process of regional cooperation with partners in the supra-region. The regional government also may have a greater voice in the process of exploiting the partnership agreement from stakeholders, reducing the state's bureaucracy in regional development policy. From then on, the central government will also make more sound and transparent decisions to support planning and regional development.

In addition, the regional government would be the new government's clue that has the main responsibility to reduce the overload of management for the central government. The 63 clues from local governments at present

for the management of the central government's management is an impossible task for ministries. The national projects that are piled on the space of the state would become more efficient for the following reasons. Firstly, the main responsibility of regional development would belong to the new regional government that would have no overlapping in land planning, increase the efficiency in labor policies by regional labor characteristics, in the basic programs of state regarding equity on poverty reduction, meanwhile, the program of building new rural countryside is not affected. However, it is necessary increase the power of the NA in land planning with the long-term vision and to reduce the authority of local government in land-related issues, thus ensuring more stability for the economic sectors in development. Besides, it is also necessary to tighten the regulations in investment management, to empower more the authorities of regional government in the investment management areas with specific conditions to ensure clearly which areas are the sustainable development areas, where the areas of technological innovation is. The policies of technological innovation need to be applied more closely in these areas and the life cycle of the investment projects should be decreased and more thoroughly calculated.

Besides, the regional government has to coordinate with the NA and the CG in order to adapt the extra-regulatory regionalism to intra-regional domestic institutions as regional innovative policies that take economic globalization into account instead of regional policy framework with only planning function at present. The new regional government level does not only support foreign enterprises in the investment approach but also improves the provincial authorities' knowledge in international economic integration issues. For some regional locomotives as PERN and PERS it is needed to reduce the investment circles so as to guarantee technological innovation beside for some underdeveloped regions such as CHs or MRN it is needed to focus on redistribution programs. Besides, because of the diversity of regional population, the regional labor policy may be implemented more effectively.

4.1.3 Threats

Political risks in the deployment at regional level are an issue that needs to be mentioned. The political will at the national level would not be ready, if political reforms at the regional level do not increase. This may increase the local autonomy, corrode the national unity and change the national political structure. This is a big risk that may nullify the will to reform. However, with a particular current political system of Vietnam, these risks can be overcome in a completely reasonable way. Firstly, if considered under the current political point of view, the Secretaries of the Party Committees of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City are the chairmen of PERN and PERS under the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Vietnam; therefore, the political authority and the safety of the central government and the state are guaranteed. Secondly, these cadres experienced the management experience at the ministerial level, even many official used to be the foreign ministers, so the capacity of these cadres in the foreign relations work can ensure in regionalization and regional articulation missions relating international integration. Thirdly, the provincial Party Committees' secretaries in the regions are still the members of the Party Central Committee; therefore, the political order is still guaranteed as before.

4.1.4 Weakness

The weakest link in the system is the issue of the system of budget at present. This is the main problem in implementing development policies at regional level. It may be said that the current budget mechanism for localities is only a temporary solution, local authorities will find solutions to increase revenues (such as increasing the tax incentives for businesses to attract investment, reducing the environmental criteria etc.) this will reduce the effectiveness of regional sustainable development and increase unhealthy competition among localities. With a focal reducing management's clues from the local to the regional level, the central government should have more

radical solutions in the plan of the regional allocation of the budget. New revenue sources would be required from the faster investment circle of projects in the region. First, regarding to technology, it would increase the efficiency of the policy of regional technological innovation and improve the quality of the regional labor. Second, it would ensure the sustainability of the land policy of the region and the sustainability of regional planning as well as reducing the new or changed land planning by the local governments through the appointed term (5 years) as a short vision of land policy (McPherson, 2012).

4.2 Suggestions

According to Jayasuriya (2009), the private or non-state sector keeps the main role in the development process of the region and cooperation among multilevel government and international organizations creates new intersection between private and public bodies. For example, Xiaobo Su (2012b) (2014) assesses that the rescaling of the Chinese state for Yunan region in the cross-border cooperation and regionalization made an important turning point in its regional economic growth. This suggestion harmonized the sustainable capital accumulation and maintains the legitimacy of socialist regime where all states of modern societies keep their function (Beresford, 2008). It also is entirely compatible between external regulations of regionalization and the institutions of the internal state.

According to Painter (2005), the neo-liberal reforms in Vietnam were changed in order to consolidate the authority of the Vietnamese state and build a new form of state-business alliances. If this model can be applied, this new mechanism will not only build market-supporting institution in the Mekong Region and Southeast Asia in following neo-liberalism and international economic integration but also will be suitable for “market socialist” trajectory of development within the key State frame. Regional vulnerabilities will be eliminated with active choices from local authority decisions instead of being a passive victim of negative external influences in “outside-in” perspective.

In the short term, the Vietnamese government is able to implement the pilot project for the pivotal economic region, such as PERS or PERN, appointing the leader who has strong political prestige in order to avoid conflicts of interest in regional politics. Besides, the government should consider fiscal mechanisms towards regional framework to guarantee the delivery mechanisms and to reduce regional disparities. In the long term, the Vietnamese National Assembly should have greater process in constitutional reforms such as the authority of regional planning and local public administration by regions, even though, these issues need further study.

5. Conclusion

Rescaling the state in the regional development is an inevitable challenge for all countries in the context of the strong economic integration and globalization. However, integration in an active way and the right adaptation to the new regime is not easy. The separated institutional characteristics and different development contexts need different development goals and routes. Vietnam is the country that is quite unique in the region based on many factors such as history, politics, economics, geography etc. and it is facing many challenges of the major institutional reforms.

The article has reviewed a new perspective for the regional development of state rescaling in Vietnam in the context of regional integration, and contributed to the transformation and adaptation of state institutions in the context of integration for institutional reform. The essay tries to choose a new direction in the emerging regulatory regionalism in Asia Pacific with regional development institutions in Vietnam. The SWOT analysis of the new

direction in the current context is to ensure enhanced accountability of localities and to harmonize the institutional model of the regulatory regionalism and national institutions. However, the unclear political strategy of the Vietnamese state can possibly lead to unstable results. Therefore, the consistent political strategy of the Vietnamese leaders will determine strongly the direction and speed of the national development.

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